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Introduction
This paper explores how South Africa fits into the regional pattern 
of trade and what a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union 
(EU) meant for South Africa’s regional trading partners. The trade agreement 
provides an illustration of this facet of South Africa’s foreign policy with a par-
ticular consideration for how this has affected SACU and the SADC region. It 
clearly demonstrates an instance when South Africa opted to negotiate with a 
major global economy without taking into consideration its SADC partners, 
choosing to “go it alone” instead. This is an interesting scenario as it demon-
strates South Africa’s potential to act in isolation – independently from its 
region. It puts into question South Africa’s need to bring its region along with 
it to the negotiation table. At the same time, however the tensions that have 
emerged in the region, among SADC members, about this very position, have 
been difficult for South Africa to manage. As such this is a scenario of South 
Africa acting alone highlighting its pursuit of narrow national interests and 
the resulting repercussions for its regional partners. The primary research 
question in relation to this instance is the extent to which the SADC region 
was a constraint or an opportunity for South Africa during these Trade, Devel-
opment and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) negotiations. 
The paper begins with a brief account of the reasons for the selection 
of this external relations example which is followed by a short description of 
the economic constraints of South Africa. A detailed synopsis of the main 
events relating to the South Africa/EU trade negotiations from 1995 to 2008 
is then presented, before this process is analysed in relation to objectives and 
1  Post-doctoral Fellow, South African National Research Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign 
Policy, University of Johannesburg. E-mail: oscarvanheerden@icon.co.za
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outcomes by the various stakeholders.
History of EU/South Africa trade relations
To provide the economic context for this example, the South Africa–
European Economic Community (EEC), and later the EU, trade flows are ana-
lysed for the period before the TDCA (1958–2000). A short description of the 
regional economic context is then provided. These provide the historic and 
economic contexts to the TDCA negotiations.
South Africa has a population of 46 million people and a GDP of 
$570,2 billion. As the nineteenth largest economy in the world at the time of 
TDCA agreement, it is seen as the economic powerhouse of Africa (Burger 
2006). The EU, on the other hand, has a population of 494 million people 
and a GDP of $13 881 Trillion (Burger 2006). Since South Africa is the larg-
est economy on the African continent and popularly seen as the gateway to 
Africa, and in light of its recent historical break (at the time) with the apart-
heid system, which left the socio-economic conditions in a terrible state, it 
makes sense why these two would want to engage in a free trade agreement. 
The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) which the two 
countries entered into, was established in January 2000.
In order to understand the trade negotiation context better, one must 
reflect on the historical patterns of trade flows between the parties. Such his-
toric analysis must take into account the changes in the South African polit-
ical landscape since 1994. The pivotal role of the transition to democracy is 
recognised by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs in its descrip-
tion of South Africa–EU relations:
The advent of a new democratic political dispensation in South Africa in 
1994 marked the dawn of a new era in South Africa–EU relations. The 
legal framework that governs South Africa’s relationship with the EU is 
the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA), which is 
premised on political dialogue, trade and economic co-operation, and de-
velopment co-operation (Burger 2006, 277-315).
However, while the new South African government took shape in 
1994, the TDCA was only provisionally implemented on 1 January 2000 and 
came into force fully on 1 May 2004. 
Table 1 presents the key events that were of major economic signifi-
cance in South African foreign relations with the EU, prior to 1995:
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Table 1: Key EU–South Africa economic events prior to 1995 
Date Key event
17 August 
1992
The Declaration and Treaty of SADC "Towards the Southern 
African Development Community", adopted in Windhoek, Namibia, 
by Heads of State or Government of Southern African States, calls 
upon all countries and people of southern Africa to develop a 
vision of a shared future, a future within a regional community.
Mar-93 Publication of "The restructuring of the South African Economy: A 
Normative Model Approach (NEM)”
Dec-93 Macro Economic Research group (MERG) growth plan final report 
published
Dec-93 Small International Monetary Fund (IMF) compensatory financing 
facility draft letter of intent accepted by the ANC
Jan-
April-94
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is electoral 
manifesto of the ANC
Apr-94 South African transition to democracy with first democratic 
elections
1994 South African becomes a member of SADC
May-94 Inauguration of President Nelson Mandela
Soon after 
May-94
Offer from EU to develop a "new relationship that could 
contribute to economic growth and development and thus to the 
strengthening of democracy in South and Southern Africa"
As illustrated in table 1, the SADC regional structure was only estab-
lished in 1992, and South Africa was not a member at the time. South Africa 
was focused on its domestic transition to democracy, and its economic focus 
was on the “Normative Model Approach” of the National Party government 
of 1993, which then led to the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) part of the election manifesto of the African National Congress (ANC) 
in 1994. 
Given that the TDCA focused primarily on trade between the two 
parties, it is important to also understand the historic patterns of the trade 
relations between the two parties. This provides the background trade context 
in which the TDCA was negotiated. As the agreement was only signed in 
2000, the historical trade patterns between the two parties prior to this date 
are described. EU trade with South Africa during this period is represented 
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: EU trade with South Africa (1958–2000)
Source: South Africa Country data extracted from European Commission, Euro Stat2
During the period from 1958 to 1980 there was a trade deficit with 
the EU importing more to South Africa than it exported from this country. 
This pattern continued until 1988 which saw a trade surplus in EU trade with 
South Africa. From 1988 to 1994 there continued to be a trade surplus. This 
roughly coincided with the period of international sanctions against South Af-
rica, which officially ended in 1991. From 1995 to 1999 EU exports to South 
Africa largely matched EU imports from South Africa, with slight trade defi-
cits evident. In 2000 there was once again a trade surplus in EU trade with 
South Africa. The EU trade balance with South Africa has fluctuated and that 
the differences in relative value of imports and exports on a year-by-year basis 
have been relatively small. 
The overall share of global trade that South Africa represents for the 
EU is particularly important as it shows South Africa’s relative importance 
while removing the effect of inflation. This is presented in Figure 2.
2  Note that data is for 1958, 1960, 1970 and then from 1981 annually. 
Oscar van Heerden
117
Figure 2: EU trade with South Africa trade as percentage share of EU–global 
trade (1958–2000)
Source: South Africa Country data extracted from European Commission, Euro Stat3
In 1958, 1,6 per cent of all EU imports were from South Africa and 
2,2 per cent of EU exports were to South Africa. By the early 1980s this had 
dropped substantially, with the percentage share of imports and exports being 
0.3% and 0.4% respectively. The decline in EU imports from South Africa in 
the apartheid period of international sanctions against South Africa is evident 
in the late eighties and early nineties. It also clearly demonstrates that EU 
trade with South Africa is relatively minor from an EU perspective, contribut-
ing less than one percent of its global trade.
The same is not true from the South African perspective. For South 
Africa, the EU is a major trading partner, accounting for 42 per cent of South 
African imports and 33 per cent of its exports in 2001.4 By way of compari-
son in 2001, South Africa accounted for 0.7 per cent of the EU imports and 
3  Note that data is for 1958, 1960, 1970 and then from 1981 annually. 
4  Trade data on the EU share of South Africa trade with the world in 2000 was not obtainable. 
As such 2001 has been used. Source: “EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World (ACP in-
cluding South Africa),” DG Trade, Trade Statistics, European Commission, EuroStat, Septem-
ber 2006. Accessed March 11, 2011. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/111465.htm
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0.6 per cent of exports to the world (European Commission, EuroStat). These 
numbers underscore the asymmetric nature of the partnership. Despite the 
quantitative differences, the importance of South Africa in relation to its do-
mestic, regional and international positioning remains considerable. 
It was only after the implementation of the EU–South Africa TDCA 
(in January 2000), that a recommendation to consider economic regional in-
tegration issues was put forward in SADC structures (in March 2001). This 
was followed by a SADC Memorandum of Understanding on Macro-Econom-
ic Convergence (in 2002). It was only in 2003 that SADC released the draft 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) as a demonstration 
of its commitment to deepening the integration processes among its mem-
bers. The RISDP is intended to 
provide strategic direction in the design and formulation of SADC pro-
grammes, projects and activities in order to achieve development and eco-
nomic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life 
of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged, 
through regional integration (Draper, Alves and Kalaba 2006).
So while the SADC was relatively new at the time of negotiating the 
EU–South Africa TDCA, and South Africa had only joined after its transition 
to democracy, it is a very important role player when consider the impact of 
the TDCA on the southern African region. As such it is important to reflect 
briefly on the trade dynamics between SADC member states. South Africa 
makes up the lion’s share of SADC trade with the world. South African im-
ports account for, on average, 78  per  cent of the SADC imports from the 
world for the period 1999–2004.5 South African exports were an average of 
72 per cent of the SADC exports during the same period.6 
South Africa is also the dominant player in SACU. This is evident 
when considering SADC trade data with the world in 2003. South Africa ac-
counted for 75  per  cent of the exports and 70  per  cent of imports. Other 
SACU members had a much smaller share of the trade flows.7 South Africa 
5  Own calculations from data extracted from: SADC Trade Development Programme (Online), 
SADC trade Database: “SADC 2007 SADC HS4 trade”, developed by the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID) and  Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies(TIPS). 
Accessed March 11, 2011. http://data.sadctrade.org/st/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
6  Own calculations from data extracted from: SADC Trade Development Programme (Online), 
SADC trade Database: “SADC 2007 SADC HS4 trade”, developed by the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID) and  Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies(TIPS). 
Accessed March 11, 2011. http://data.sadctrade.org/st/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
7  Own calculations from data extracted from: SADC Trade Development Programme (Online), 
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is the dominant player in both SADC and SACU and its membership in both 
bodies is the source of some regional tensions.
Key events in the South Africa/EU TDCA process
The following table presents the key events that were of major eco-
nomic significance in South African foreign relations with the EU, from 1995 
to 2008.
Table 2: Key EU–South African relevant economic events from 1995 to 2008 
Date Key event
Soon after 
May 1994
Offer from EU to develop a "new relationship that could 
contribute to economic growth and development and thus to the 
strengthening of democracy in South and Southern Africa" (Davies 
2000)
1996 So-called butterfly strategy developed by the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry prioritised development of 
relationships with the developing world: Africa (the body of the 
butterfly), in the Indian Ocean rim and Asia including China (one of 
the wings) and Latin America and the Atlantic (the other wing)
1996 The SADC Protocol on Trade was signed in Maseru, Lesotho
March 
1996
Mandate given by the EU Council to seek exclusion of a long list 
of products (making up 46% of South Africa's current agricultural 
exports to the EU)
June 1996 Growth Employment and Redistribution: A Macro-economic 
strategy (GEAR) report proposes an accelerated programme of 
privatisation, deregulation and fiscal restraint. It targets a 6,1% 
growth rate and the creation of 409 000 jobs per annum by the 
year 2000.
1997 European commission Green Paper on relations between the 
EU and ACP countries on the eve of the twenty-first century: 
challenges and opportunities for a new partnership
1997 South Africa admitted to the Lomé Convention with extremely 
restricted conditions
End of 
1997
South Africa presents a detailed trade offer to the EU
Early 1998 EU presents a detailed trade offer to South Africa
SADC trade Database: “SADC 2007 SADC HS4 trade”, developed by the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID) and  Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies(TIPS). 
Accessed March 11, 2011. http://data.sadctrade.org/st/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
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Date Key event
June 1998 South Africa’s qualified membership of the Lomé Convention 
comes into effect
29 Jan 
1999
South African and EU Commission agreement on text in Davos 
Switzerland
24 March 
1999
Heads of government of the EU give approval for a TDCA
26 October 
1999
COSATU submission on EU-RSA Trade and Development 
Cooperation Agreement, presented to a joint sitting of the 
portfolio committees on trade and industry, foreign affairs, 
agriculture and land affairs, and the NCOP select committee on 
economic affairs
2000 Expiry of Lomé IV convention (EU-ACP)
January 
2000
Implementation of SA-EU TDCA
April 2000 Africa – EU summit held in Cairo
1 
September 
2000
Implementation phase of the SADC Protocol on Trade which 
encompasses the establishment of a Free Trade Area by 2008 
(Burger 2002, 146).
2000/2001 The establishment, through Trade and Investment South Africa 
(TISA) of the Department of Trade and Industry, of “trade and 
investment promotion offices on the continent for the purpose of 
facilitating trade and investment between South Africa and the 
continent …. [African] offices are located in Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, 
Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe [and] Mauritius” 
(Burger 2002, 144).
March 
2001
Review Report approved by the SADC Heads of State and 
Government at the Extraordinary Summit held in Windhoek, 
Namibia, which recommended, among other things, the 
formulation of a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP)
August 
2001
Amended Declaration and Treaty of SADC, signed in Blantyre
September 
2001
Conclusion of the new Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
Agreement, in which the International Trade and Economic 
Development Division of the Department of trade and Industry 
(ITED) played a pivotal role (Burger 2003, 159).
2001/2002 The South African Department of Trade and Investment is 
“mandated the task of providing support services to the 
establishment of NEPAD” (Burger 2003, 157).
February 
2002
Wine and Spirits agreement between South Africa and the 
European Community signed (Burger 2003, 159).
2002 SADC Memorandum of Understanding on Macro Economic 
Convergence
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Date Key event
March 
2003
Draft Regional Indicative Strategic Plan released by SADC 
secretariat
July 2004 New SACU agreement comes into force (Burger 2007, 169).
August 
2004
SADC secretariat finalising the mid-term review on the 
implementation of the SADC Protocol on trade
Mid 2005 All SADC countries (with the exception of Angola, the DRC and 
Madagascar) were implementing the SADC Trade Protocol 
(Burger 2007, 169).
August 
2005
SACU concluded a Free Trade Agreement with European Free 
Trade Area (FTA) States (Burger 2007, 170).
August 
2005
South Africa and the EU signed the Enlargement Protocol, which 
provides for South Africa to extend the TDCA preferences to 10 
new member states and vice versa (Burger 2007, 170).
March 
2006
SADC proposal for a way forward vis-à-vis the EU, a framework in 
which the revised TDCA is to play a key role
Mid 2006 Substantial progress on harmonising documentation, and 
procedures, and in preparing the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance among Customs 
Administrators in SADC countries (Burger 2007, 169).
December 
2007
EU Africa summit held in Lisbon
In economic terms the most significant event in the above sequence 
was arguably the shift in macroeconomic policy from the RDP policy docu-
ment to GEAR. Another important event was the fact that South Africa had 
wanted to attain full membership of the Lomé Convention through which 
it would have qualified for various forms of developmental assistance and 
aid. However South Africa was not, at first, admitted to this agreement, and 
when it was later, this was only with qualified membership. The reason was 
that South Africa plays a dominant role in trade between the African Carib-
bean Pacific (ACP) countries and the EU. Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) countries (other than South Africa), together with the ACP countries 
were signatories to Lomé. For the EU, taking into consideration the economic 
plight of many of the Lomé signatories and their low economic base, a blanket 
approach and concessions from the EU would greatly advantage the South 
African economy. This has implications for the impact of the TDCA on the 
regions, which are examined later in this chapter.
Finally the above sequence of events clearly shows that South Africa’s 
involvement in, and membership of SADC, ran in parallel to the TDCA ne-
gotiation process. 
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The South Africa/EU TDCA
A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed in 2000 between South Africa 
and the EU committed South Africa to grant duty-free access to 86 per cent 
of EU imports over a period of 12 years, while the EU committed to liberalise 
95 per cent of South Africa’s imports over a ten-year period (Southern Af-
rican Development Community Cooperation in Standardisation). It was ex-
pected that the TDCA would help to restructure the South African economy 
and stimulate long term economic growth (Southern African Development 
Community Cooperation in Standardisation). Rob Davies, South Africa’s dep-
uty Minister of Trade and Industry, reflected that the main objectives of the 
TDCA were to address “the problem that South Africa had the worst possible 
terms of access into the EU market”.8 He also indicated that the agreement 
covered “trade and related issues, co-operation in economic, social and po-
litical fields”.9 The agreement also provided “a legal framework for ongoing 
EU financial assistance on grants and loans for development co-operation, 
which [amounted] to R900  million per year”. (Southern African Develop-
ment Community Cooperation in Standardisation). The main provisions of 
the FTA were agreements on:
• An asymmetric timetable;
• Identification and protection of sensitive products;
• The integration of South Africa into the global economy;
• The introduction of the “rules of origin” doctrine; 
• Cooperation in diverse fields.
Each is explained briefly below.
An asymmetric timetable was agreed upon by both parties in the 
agreement. This meant that while the trade agreements were reciprocal, each 
party had different timeframes for achieving the targeted objectives. Gener-
ous timelines were specified for both parties to ensure mutual benefit with-
in the time frame agreed upon. Given the massive restructuring agenda of 
South Africa, the EU agreed that it would open up its markets faster than 
8   Interview with Rob Davies, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, conducted early 
2009.
9  Interview with Rob Davies, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, conducted early 
2009.
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would South Africa. 
The identification of certain sensitive products was deemed neces-
sary by both parties to agree on the protection of key sectors. This was done 
especially where there were seen to be undue impact on South Africa’s neigh-
bouring trade partners. Thus, some products were excluded from the agree-
ment in order to protect vulnerable sectors on both sides. These were mainly 
agricultural products. From the South African side, products which are of 
interest for those neighbouring countries within SACU were also excluded. 
South Africa wanted products from the motor vehicle industry, textiles and 
clothing to be excluded while the EU wanted mainly agricultural products to 
fall within this ambit (Southern African Development Community Coopera-
tion in Standardisation). This was of particular importance for both parties 
since there was a tacit understanding that if the parties did not confine these 
sensitive products to the periphery of the trade agreement, endless problems 
would have been encountered by the negotiating teams. 
The agreement also wanted to ensure the integration of South Africa 
into the world economy. This is made explicit in the following extract on the 
aims of the FTA:
The creation of the FTA aims to end South Africa’s economic isolation fol-
lowing the Apartheid regime by helping to promote economic growth. In 
this respect, the free trade agreement fully complies with the rules of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the key organisation of the world econ-
omy (Southern African Development Community Cooperation in Stand-
ardisation).
In addition to the above, the provisions of the TDCA extend to coop-
eration in fields as diverse as:
• Social cooperation, where both parties committed to initiating dia-
logue on this subject in order to tackle questions relating to the social 
problems of a society coming out of an era of apartheid. They both 
guaranteed basic social rights such as the freedom of association; 
• Co-operation to protect the environment; 
• Cultural cooperation; 
• Co-operation in the fight against drugs and money laundering; and
• Co-operation in the field of health and, in particular, the fight against 
AIDS (Southern African Development Community Cooperation in 
Standardisation).
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The above was particularly important for the EU since most coun-
tries were in agreement that given the history of South Africa, it needed help 
beyond the economic front. Apartheid had left the country with many social 
and political woes and hence an economic package in the absence of tackling 
these components would be a futile exercise. 
Analysis of the South Africa/EU TDCA process
With the above understanding of the main events that have transpired 
in the EU–South African TDCA, of the South African economic context at 
this time, and of the substance of the TDCA, it is now possible to provide 
an analytical interpretation of them. This analysis is conducted in order to 
reflect on the interplay between South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour at the 
regional and international levels in this economic example. This section ex-
amines the South African government objectives, and the outcomes of these 
both domestically and regionally in relation to the EU TDCA.
An examination of the ACP trade data shows that South Africa dom-
inates not only intra trade among the signatories but also trade with other 
countries in the world, and is clearly not in the same economic position as 
the other ACP countries.10 This makes it clear why the EU decided to only 
allow South Africa qualified membership into the Lomé Convention. When 
asking the question why the EU did not accept South Africa as a full member 
of Lomé, one must look at a number of reasons. According to Hill (2001), 
European motives were clearly a mixture of the internal and the external. He 
argues that internally, ministers were always aware of the perceived threat 
that South Africa posed to both European farmers and industrial workers, by 
virtue of its semi-developed position. He continues that, externally, the EU’s 
motives were rather more statesmanlike and less obviously self-interested. 
The EU’s interests lay not only in seeing South Africa recover politically and 
blossom economically, but also in seeing it become the engine of growth in 
the whole of southern Africa, a region that has been blighted by war, poverty 
and disease since the 1970s. The EU wished to see regional integration devel-
op in southern Africa, and this would not have happened if South Africa had 
acceded to the trade and aid chapters of Lomé (Hill 2001). Given the relatively 
small economies of the ACP economies, with preferential stipulations from 
the EU a necessity when dealing with such economies, a useful and construc-
tive engagement with an economy such as South Africa would simply not 
10  Data on ACP trade separates South Africa from the other African countries in recognition 
of how significantly the South African data skews the overall analysis.
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have been possible. 
South Africa was in a very difficult position preceding the trade ne-
gotiations with the EU. On the one hand, it had to be seen to want to redress 
the huge imbalances created by the apartheid regime and improve the lives 
of ordinary South Africans. This almost certainly meant more state interven-
tion in the economy, possibly a programme of nationalisation of key sectors 
in the economy and a heavy emphasis on social welfare. On the other hand, 
South Africa faced the realities of the global market, which among other is-
sues would entail an opening of the domestic market and the liberalising of 
the economy to attract foreign direct investment. The latter, some argue, flows 
against the former objective. It was constraints such as these that shaped 
South Africa’s approach and policy objectives as it entered into trade negotia-
tions with the EU.
The South African government projects itself as having SADC as the 
“centrepiece” of its foreign economic policy (Hill 2001). This projection of its 
foreign economic policy is clearly evident when tracking how the South Afri-
can government has described its trade relations with Africa and the SADC 
since 2000 in its yearbook.11 The descriptions of African relations in these 
documents are revealing of how South Africa would like to be seen to be act-
ing in its economic relations:
Table 3: Yearbook descriptions of South Africa’s economic trade relations with 
EU and the SADC 2001–2008 
Year 
book Description of SADC trade relations 
Description of EU trade 
relations
2001/02
“Africa forms the focus of South Africa’s 
global economic strategy, within which the 
government pursues a strong developmental 
agenda partnerships with countries on the 
continent are therefore considered vital and 
strategic” (Burger 2002, 144). 
“The centerpiece of South Africa’s foreign 
policy is the SADC… South Africa’s interests 
and objective in the southern African region 
and guided by strong linkages between the 
domestic and regional economy” (Burger 
2002, 145).
“Relations with Europe, 
with the EU as the pivot, are 
economically crucial…The 
historic TDCA between South 
Africa and the EU…is a key 
component of South Africa’s 
trade policy since the EU is 
the countries largest trade 
and investment partner, 
accounting for about 40% 
of South Africa’s total world 
trade” (Burger 2002, 147).
11  No yearbooks were produced and published publicly in the period 1995–1999. The year-
books start from 2001/02 and are published annually thereafter.
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Year 
book Description of SADC trade relations 
Description of EU trade 
relations
2002/03 As above and (with specific reference to 
African and SADC as key market for SA 
goods):
“Africa is an important market for South 
African exports” (Burger 2003, 156).
“As the market for a large proportion of South 
Africa’s high value-added exports, the growth 
o these domestic industries is inextricably 
linked to the growth of the region’s economies” 
(Burger 2003, 157).
Mention is made of the trade imbalances with 
the rest of Africa, as being largely “offset by 
South Africa’s investment in the continent, 
aimed at infrastructural projects designed to 
enhance the productive capacities of African 
economies” (Burger 2003, 156).
 “In southern Africa, South Africa seeks to 
restructure regional arrangements promoting 
industrialization. The department supports 
the process whereby interested manufacturing 
platforms are the basis for an integrated 
regional industrial strategy. This entails using 
southern Africa as an integral part of supply 
chains for globally competitive manufacturing 
processes. Through a combination of sectoral 
cooperation, policy co-ordination, and trade 
integration, South Africa’s regional policy 
aims to achieve a dynamic regional economy 
capable of competing effectively in the global 
economy” (Burger 2003, 157).
Largely as above with 
specific reference to the 
TDCA, and. 
“The long awaited wine a 
spirits agreement between 
South Africa and the 
European Community was 
signed in February 2002, 
concluding the TDCA, and 
firmly establishing South 
African wines and spirits 
exports in its major market” 
(Burger 2003, 159).
2003/04 As above and:
“South Africa’s economy is inextricably 
linked to that of the southern African region 
and its own success is linked to economic 
recovery of the continent through NEPAD. 
The development challenges must be viewed 
in light of the mutually beneficial economic 
and developmental impact of South Africa 
and Africa’s self-enforcing and economic 
existence” (Burger 2004, 169).
As above
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Year 
book Description of SADC trade relations 
Description of EU trade 
relations
2004/05 As above and a description of the work 
of the International Trade and Economic 
Development (ITED) division of the 
Department of Trade and Industry which 
has a global economic strategy which “was 
formulated in light of the country’s relations 
with SADC, the rest of Africa, NEPAD and 
economic relations with the developed and 
developing trading partners in the North and 
South” (Burger 2005, 160).
And:
“Since attaining democracy in 1994 South 
Africa has put regional integration by SADC 
member states at the top of its foreign 
economic agenda. This approach comes from 
the belief in the economic benefits that can 
be brought to all member states by closer 
economic cooperation in the region.”
As above with:
“Trade relations with 
Europe, particularly the EU 
a pivotal to South Africa’s 
economic development. The 
TDCA with the EU forms a 
substantial element of South 
Africa’s reconstruction and 
development” (Burger 2005, 
163).
2005/06 As above. As above.
2006/07 As above, and:
“Addressing development challenges will be 
mutually beneficial to South Africa and the 
rest of Africa”.
 Mention is made of the SACU free Trade 
Agreement with the European Free Trade 
Area EFTA (of August 2005)
As above and
“In August 2005, South 
Africa and the EU signed 
an enlargement Protocol, 
which provides for South 
African to extend the TDCA 
preferences to the 10 new 
members states and vice 
versa” (Burger 2007, 170).
2007/08 Largely as above and:
“To complement the SADC and SACU 
processes, South Africa pursues a bilateral 
strategy for engagement with countries in 
the southern African region. This strategy 
is underpinned by the objective of achieving 
economic growth and development in 
the region through outward investment, 
infrastructure development and trade 
liberalization” (Burger 2008, 148).
As above
This table shows the chronological development of the increasing so-
phistication of South Africa’s projection of its relations with SADC which is 
the “centre piece” of its foreign policy, and the EU relations which are the 
“pivot”, and “economically crucial”. The descriptions relating to Africa and 
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SADC show that over time, South Africa’s projection of its role in Africa be-
comes more sophisticated, shifting from seeing Africa as a market to having 
its development challenges as critical to its own success. 
The relations with EU are largely already in place by 2000, with only 
the wine and spirits agreement being delayed until 2002. So while there was 
planned talk of a parallel process in reality to EU engagement preceded the 
SADC and SACU processes with South Africa concluding these bilaterally, 
before bringing SADC along with it, as this regional structure matured. 
It is clear the government talk has been of having SADC and south-
ern African region as the centrepiece of its economic foreign policy. However 
the extent to which this has been enacted and become a reality is far less clear. 
This tension, between vision or intention and concrete actualisation of trade 
relations, is described by Qobo, when he explains that talking about the SADC 
region “is very tricky”.12 He elaborates that when the government engaged in 
its relationships with SADC in the early nineteen nineties, there were a set 
of assumptions about SADC being at the heart of the foreign economic poli-
cy, where “our destinies in South Africa are primed to the destinies in SAD-
C”.13 However, “what has not happened is to define precisely what we seek to 
achieve in the region for South Africa”.14 
The shift to emphasising trade and development is evident in the dis-
cussion with Qobo, from the Department of Trade and Industry. He explains 
that there has been some “high level thinking where we try and shift empha-
sis to what we call developmental regionalism” 15 (my emphasis). This is also 
evident when he explained the role of the International Trade and Economic 
Development (ITED) division of the DTI:
The focus on trade policy development as a cross cutting area and South 
Africa’s attitude to trade, transcends the conventional textbook trade view. 
We are aware of the unique role we play in the broader continent, so any 
component of our work is developmental.16
12  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, responsible for 
trade policy development, conducted early 2009. 
13  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, responsible for 
trade policy development, conducted early 2009. 
14  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, responsible for 
trade policy development, conducted early 2009. 
15  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, responsible for 
trade policy development, conducted early 2009. 
16  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, responsible for 
trade policy development, conducted early 2009. 
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He went on to explain that trade policy forms an integral part of their 
overall foreign policy of South Africa:
We are conscious of the fact that you cannot “dis-embed” trade policy from 
the broader foreign policy objective. One example is when you look at the 
foreign missions operations abroad you will immediately notice that you 
will have [representatives] from DTI as well as from DFA. So there is a 
conscious understanding of the interrelatedness of the two roles of trade 
and foreign policy.17
This shows that South Africa seeks to project a developmental trade 
policy agenda towards SADC. It used the same approach in its EU negotia-
tions, positioning the TDCA as an agreement of both trade and development.
Domestic outcomes
In January 1999 there was agreement on the text of an EU South Af-
rican agreement. The heads of government of the EU soon (March 1999) gave 
formal approval for the TDCA. In October 1999 the South African domestic 
concerns about the TDCA process and content were officially documented 
by the broad-based South African labour federation, the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU). COSATU raised various concerns about 
the broad consultations undertaken by the South African government. These 
processes it felt were inadequate for COSATU to input substantively and con-
tinuously into the negotiation process. 
Within this context of domestic concerns about the TDCA process, 
the South African government therefore deemed it important that they stress 
the developmental character of the agreement, in order for them to be in a 
position to effectively address the socio-economic imbalances of the broader 
South African population. Notwithstanding this government positioning of 
the TDCA at the time of the negotiations, the extent to which the TDCA was 
actually developmental in its final outcomes has been questioned domestical-
ly. Vickers argues that “we should stop talking about the TDCA as a develop-
mental agreement. It was a hard-nosed bruising trade negotiation…We fought 
hard and learnt a lot of lessons.”18 Davies also expresses the outcomes of the 
TDCA for South Africa, in terms of economic gains, and not developmental 
17  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, responsible for 
trade policy development, conducted early 2009.
18  Interview with Brendan Vickers, senior researcher on multilateral trade, Institute for Global 
Dialogue, February 2009.
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ones: 
I think by and large we [South Africa] secured a reasonable outcome in 
terms of access into the EU markets, access by the EU producers into the 
South African market, while not undermining our most sensitive sectors.19
This sentiment is also voiced by Qobo who describes the main objec-
tives of the TDCA, from the South African perspective, as being “to expand 
trade between the EU and South Africa”.20 Davies makes a similar point about 
how the commercial interests of the EU over-ride their developmental imper-
atives. He explains that 
when you meet with the developed world to negotiate a trade agreement, 
on the one side they put all their best intentions to try and help; and on the 
other, they put… just look at it as a straight fight between commercial inter-
ests. And [the latter] is what it is ultimately about. They have commercial 
interests and they will pursue their commercial interests. And their com-
mercial interests will be a limitation as to what they are prepared to grant 
you for other [developmental] reasons. That’s just the reality – and that was 
evident in the TDCA negotiations as well.21
At the time of the TDCA agreement, the South African public saw 
media reports on South Africa’s role in championing a pro-Africa trade agree-
ment, through support for the cancellation of African debt, engagement with 
the G8 on farm subsidies in the agricultural sector. 
Regional outcomes
 
Substantial tension existed for South Africa in managing the percep-
tions with regional neighbours. SADC was not yet mature and in a position to 
negotiate directly with the EU and simultaneously South Africa was not seen 
as qualifying to be part of the Lomé convention. These regional tensions are 
clear articulated by Qobo who explains that there was a combination of his-
toric mistrust and concern about South Africa’s dominant role in the region, 
and resentment at South Africa’s exceptional status and relative economic 
19  Interview with Rob Davies, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, conducted 
early 2009.
20  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, responsible for trade 
policy development, conducted early 2009.
21  Interview with Rob Davies, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, conducted 
early 2009.
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prosperity in the region.22 He explained that historically (during the Union of 
South Africa and during apartheid), the southern African regional countries 
were regarded as extensions of South Africa. The foreign policy role was very 
“overt” and “dominant”.23 This historical fear was coupled with a new fou-
nd hope that South Africa holds the key to embracing a new regional policy 
approach – one that is positive, and in contrast to this historical past. Qobo 
explained that at the same time, “there has always been resentment [from the 
southern African countries, about] the level of economic growth that South 
Africa has enjoyed, and the diversity of its structural capacities”.24 
It is clear that from the perspective of the other countries in the re-
gion, as well as from the EU, South Africa was seen as different, or set apart 
from, the rest of the region. It was seen as “an African country that is different 
from its neighbours”.25 There was a major tension in how much more com-
mercially productive and competitive South Africa is in relation to its neigh-
bours. The dominance of South Africa in SADC is stressed by Draper et al., 
when they argue that South Africa is not an “ordinary” SADC member state, 
as it “dominates the region economically (accounting for about 60 per cent 
of SADC total trade and about 70 per cent of SADC GDP), rendering it indis-
pensable for any regional economic integration process” (Draper, Alves and 
Kalaba 2006). 
Brendan Vickers describes this tension between South Africa and 
the other SADC member as a “long-standing tension” and attributes this to 
the conflicts created by South Africa negotiating alone with the EU, while 
simultaneously being part of SACU.26 He explains that as a result of South 
Africa’s membership in SACU, “whatever common external tariff was agreed 
in the [TDCA] negotiation, would automatically apply to the lesser developed 
members of the customs union [SACU]”.27 Qobo corroborates, that the major 
tension facing the region with regard to the TDCA, was the impact that re-
ducing trade tariffs would have on other SACU members. He explained that 
22  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, responsible for trade 
policy development, conducted early 2009.
23  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, responsible for trade 
policy development, conducted early 2009.
24  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, responsible for trade 
policy development, conducted early 2009.
25  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, responsible for trade 
policy development, conducted early 2009.
26  Interview with Brendan Vickers, senior researcher on multilateral trade, Institute for Glob-
al Dialogue, February 2009.
27  Interview with Brendan Vickers, senior researcher on multilateral trade, Institute for Global 
Dialogue, February 2009.
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reducing trade tariffs in the TDCA would increase imports from the EU into 
the region, thereby reducing the SACU tariff revenue, on which a number of 
SACU members depend.28 
Vickers elaborates that there are contesting narratives that have 
emerged from the regions response to the TDCA purpose, and postulates 
that “only insiders” would have a true understanding of what actually tran-
spired.29 On the one hand, it is reported that South Africa put forward its 
position as being part of SACU, and not wanting to or being able to “leave 
our neighbours behind”; and it was the EU that argued for an agreement with 
South Africa, given that the other SADC and SACU members were included 
in the Cotonou Agreement, from which South Africa was excluded.30 On the 
other hand a “conspiracy theory” is put forward that South Africa negotiated 
in isolation, as it wanted to “break up SACU, because they [South Africa] don’t 
need SACU any more”.31 This sentiment is further supported by Grant, who 
argues that as an economic powerhouse in the South, South Africa found it 
difficult to satisfy its own trade needs and that of the region but it attempted 
to satisfy this objective as far as possible. As Grant stipulates, negotiating 
the TDCA for South Africa meant the exclusion of the SACU countries with 
detrimental consequences for the Botswana Lesotho Namibia and Swaziland 
(BLNS) countries. She indicates that, 
even though South Africa was a member of SACU at the time of entering 
into negotiations with the EU, it chose to do so alone and not to include 
the BLNS 4 countries. The Agreement has had a large impact on the BLNS 
who are effectively de facto parties to the TDCA. Because of the common 
external tariff in SACU, the BLNS will be forced to reduce their tariffs on 
imports from the EU at the rate agreed by South Africa in the TDCA (Grant 
2006).
She further states that because of the above, this was expected to have 
an impact on tariff revenue for the BLNS and it has been estimated that this 
could be around a 21 per cent decrease (Greenberg 2000 apud Grant 2006). 
Botswana has been estimated to lose around 10 per cent of its total national 
28  Interview with Mzukizi Qobo, Department of Trade and Industry, responsible for trade 
policy development, conducted early 2009.
29  Interview with Brendan Vickers, senior researcher on multilateral trade, Institute for Glob-
al Dialogue, February 2009.
30  Interview with Brendan Vickers, senior researcher on multilateral trade, Institute for Global 
Dialogue, February 2009.
31  Interview with Brendan Vickers, senior researcher on multilateral trade, Institute for Global 
Dialogue, February 2009.
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income as a result of the TDCA (Sandrey 2005 apud Grant 2006).
In opposition to this general view, the extent to which there was re-
gional tension caused directly by the TDCA was down-played by Davis, when 
he argues that at the time of the TDCA negotiation, there was no agreement 
in place with SACU to negotiate together and explains that although the other 
SACU members were affected by the TDCA outcomes, there was some con-
sultation with them. In his view the tensions with regard to the way the BLNS 
countries were affected by the TDCA was “not such a major factor”.32 
SADC members were however clearly weary of South Africa, due to 
its historic role in the region, as well as its exceptional economic and competi-
tive status. As a result, several SADC members hold overlapping and compet-
ing membership of regional bodies. These bring with them, their own set of 
complexities. These challenges and the explicit impact on relationships with 
the EU are made clear by Kalaba et al., in this extract: 
Deepening integration in SADC remains a highly challenging and con-
tentious process, hence member states are cautious in their approach. On 
the one hand member states have made commitments of deeper regional 
integration through various steps, from free trade area to common mar-
kets, as stipulated in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP) document. On the other hand, members remain committed to 
multiple and overlapping memberships to other regions despite obvious 
incompatibilities. Instead of seeking solutions to the existing problems, 
more complexities to the problem are added. The recent addition is in the 
form of the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreement with the European 
Union. All these are taking place concomitant with the need to harmonise 
domestic policies of those regional groupings to which they are members 
(Kalaba et al. 2006). 
Dicks who reflected on this issue by explaining that “we have to ac-
cept that the levels of economic activity and growth [between south Africa and 
rest of SADC] are at different levels, and that South Africa is an “exception 
from the rest”.33 He pointed out that this exceptional status has some negative 
implications for South Africa. It is not able to benefit from duty free and quota 
free access to European markets, as it is in a different economic position to 
32  Interview with Rob Davies, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, conducted 
early 2009.
33  Interview with Rudi Dicks, executive director of the National Labour Education and Devel-
opment Institute, and former Policy Specialist on Labour Market Trade and Economic Affairs, 
COSATU, conducted in 2008 and early 2009.
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other SADC countries for example.34 
In the 2001/02 yearbook, trade relations with SADC are described 
in relation to South Africa’s trade surplus, and the trade imbalance in the 
region: “Although a sizable share of South Africa’s exports is destined from 
SACU and other SADC countries, South Africa imports relatively little from 
the region” (Burger 2002).
Table 4: South African trade with SADC (2000) (Burger 2002) 
2000: Billions 
of rands
South African 
exports to
South African 
imports from
Total trade 
value
Trade 
balance
SADC 15 2.6 17.6 12.4
In contrast, the 2001/02 yearbook described trade with Europe (with 
the EU as the pivot) in quantitative terms: 
Europe is the largest source of investment for South Africa and accounts 
for almost half of South Africa’s total foreign trade. Seven of South Africa’s 
ten top trading partners are European countries (Burger 2002). 
The actual trade figures for 2000 are then presented in some detail. 
These are tabulated below:
Table 5: South African trade with European countries (2000) (Burger 2002)
2000: Billions 
of rands
South African 
exports to
South African 
imports from
Total trade 
value
Trade 
balance
Britain 18.9 16.1 35 2.8
Germany 16.4 24.8 41.2 -8.4
France 3.9 7.8 11.7 -3.9
Switzerland 3.7 4.4 8.1 -0.7
Belgium 6.4 2.9 9.3 3.5
Sweden 1 2.9 3.9 -1.9
Denmark 1.3
Italy 3
34  Interview with Rudi Dicks, executive director of the National Labour Education and Devel-
opment Institute, and former Policy Specialist on Labour Market Trade and Economic Affairs, 
COSATU, conducted in 2008 and early 2009.
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Central and 
Eastern 
Europe
2.5
Total of 
reported 
European 
trade (in 
2001/02) 
yearbook
50.3 58.9 116 -8.6
From this it is clear that, although SADC may be called the “centre-
piece” of South Africa’s foreign economic policy, it is quantitatively eclipsed 
by the amount of trade with merely a selection of European countries. Total 
trade with Germany alone is more than double the total trade that South Af-
rica has with 14 SADC countries. The significant trade surplus with SADC 
countries further diminishes its “centrepiece” position.
In the 2007/08 yearbook, trade relations with SADC are described 
thus: 
Since the attaining democracy in 1994, South Africa has but regional inte-
gration at the top of its foreign economic agenda. South Africa has pursued 
a policy combining sectoral co-operation, policy coordination and trade in-
tegration to forge a dynamic regional economy capable of competing effec-
tively in the global economy (Burger 2009, 148).
Table 6: South African trade with SADC (2006) (Burger 2009) 
2000: Billions 
of rands
South African 
exports to
South African 
imports from 
Total trade 
value
Trade 
balance
SADC 35,849 10,440 46,289 25,409
The overall trade ratio between South Africa and SADC had dimin-
ished from the year 2000 levels of 7:1 to 3:1. 
The 2007/08 yearbook described trade with Europe again as: 
Trade relations with Europe, particularly with the EU, are pivotal to South 
Africa’s economic development. The TDCA with the EU forms a substan-
tial element of South Africa’s reconstruction and development.
The trade figures for 2006 are presented in relation to Europe and 
the EU:
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Table 7: South African trade with Europe and the EU (2006) (Burger 2009)
2006: Billions of 
rands
South African 
exports to
South African 
imports from 
Total trade 
value
Trade 
balance
Europe 139,574 168,198 307,772 -28,624
EU (as part of the 
above) 126,373 161,053 287,426 -34,680
Figures 3 and 4 present EU trade with South Africa in value terms, 
and as a percentage of EU trade with the world:
Figure 3: EU trade with South Africa (2000-2006)
Source: South Africa Country data extracted from European Commission, Euro Stat35
The value of EU trade with South Africa has increased following the 
TDCA and the percentage of EU trade with South Africa has been within the 
0.6% range, with increased for 0.7% in 2004-2006. However, the projection 
of SADC as the centerpiece of South Africa’s policy, seems not be actualised 
when considering the actual trade patterns. The EU has far more prominence 
in the trade data, than SADC does. In this regard, South Africa does not seem 
to be providing to the region in terms of a trade.
35  Note that data is for 1958, 1960, 1970 and then from 1981 annually.
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Figure 4: EU trade with South Africa as percentage share of EU–global trade 
(2000-2006)
Source: South Africa Country data extracted from European Commission, Euro Stat36
Conclusion
From the historic context and process tracing analysis presented in 
this chapter, it is important to bear in mind that the EU–SA TDCA was the 
first bilateral agreement that South Africa negotiated post apartheid. It is clear 
that SADC was in its infancy at the time of the EU TDCA negotiations and 
as such the main reason for South Africa negotiating on its own, and not as 
a SADC member. Given the point in time at which the TDCA took place a 
bilateral agreement with the EU was inevitable. This benefited South Africa 
(over its neighbours), but as SADC structures have matured, and South Africa 
increases its provision to these regional integration processes the region is set 
to benefit.
The South African government policy towards the SADC region and 
Africa in general is increasingly developmental regionalism. South Africa 
takes on its role as representing the region and Africa in general in global 
forums, and there has been a clear shift in the projection of its foreign policy 
from Africa being viewed as potential market for South African commercial 
36  Note that data is for 1958, 1960, 1970 and then from 1981 annually. 
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activity, towards South Africa as supporting and driving investments in infra-
structure and development in the region, and continent more broadly. The 
emergence of the ITED division of the DTI shows this growing institutional 
capacity to support its trade and development agenda. The Economic Free 
Trade Agreement (EPA) and SACU FTA have taken place on the back of the 
experience gleaned and capacity developed through the TDCA process.
As for the issue of dualism as it relates to trade negotiations, this will 
remain an obstacle for as long as the “neo-mercantilist” world view remains 
intact. Nations will always put their domestic priorities above those of the 
regional partners unless they begin to put into practice an alternative view of 
how they might survive economically within this globalised market economy. 
Will the TDCA ultimately result in the growth patterns needed by the 
South African economy in order to create the much needed job opportunities? 
Only time will tell. There are many different views on what South Africa could 
have done differently during this negotiation process but be that as it may, the 
South African government is resolute that the TDCA with the EU has pro-
duced the required results and that it will continue to do so in the immediate 
future. South Africa is also very much satisfied with its standing within the 
international arena at this point in history. It has been welcomed into almost 
all the necessary international organisations and has already demonstrated in 
many respects that it can fulfil a leadership role if and when required to do so, 
as we have seen with the chairpersonship of the World Bank and the IMF, as 
well as the current rotating seat in the United Nations Security Council. 
Finally, the twin track approach adopted by the EU Commission (even 
though it met huge resistance from certain quarters at times) did finally pay 
off. The Director General for Development would have wanted to see greater 
concessions made for South Africa but in general a better deal came out of 
these negotiations than have been initially anticipated. Even though, the same 
cannot be said for the region as such. As for South Africa and the socio-politi-
cal advances attained, the EU can only but be satisfied that not only has there 
been sufficient progress but that their ultimate aim of wanting to position 
South Africa as a leading power on the continent has come to fruition. SADC 
however, one must conclude, was a constraining factor for South Africa dur-
ing these trade negotiations. Only time will tell whether further economic in-
tegration in the region, will ultimately lead to the desired economic outcomes. 
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ABSTRACT
In the years between 1995 and 2008 South Africa was engaged in trade negotiations 
with the European Union (EU), which were seen as platform for addressing the 
trade imbalances in favour of the EU. In 2002, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was 
signed between South Africa and the EU. Despite its membership to the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), South Africa engaged on the negotiations 
on its own which led to trade and political tensions with other countries within 
the community. By going alone South Africa was clearly indicating an appetite to 
vigorously pursue its interests at the expense of regional partners. It is argued that the 
exclusion, at an early stage of the negotiations, of other regional countries within SADC 
was counterproductive and had the potential to harm the regional trade relations. In 
addition, the change of approach at later stage that brought in the regional approach 
to the negotiations improved the regional trade relations within SADC. 
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